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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
DAMAGES-PLEADING,

EVIDENCE,

AND

ASSESSMENT-WHETrr,

IN

PERSONAL INJURY SUIT, JURY IS ENTITLED TO LEARN OF INCIDENCE OF
TAXATION FOR PURPOSE OF FIXING MEASURE OF REcovERY-In the recent
personal injury suit entitled Hall v. Chicago & North Western Railway
Company,' counsel for the defendant, in a closing argument, mentioned
to the jury that, in the event the verdict was for the plaintiff, the amount

recovered by plaintiff would not be subject to deduction for federal income tax. Objection to this remark was sustained and the trial court,
being of the opinion that the statement had resulted in prejudice to the
plaintiff, ordered that a new trial should be had. Defendant appealed
from this order to the Appellate Court for the First District and that
court concluded that, as the remarks made were proper, the trial court
order had to be reversed and the case remanded with direction to reinstate
the verdict. The plaintiff thereafter carried the case to the Illinois Supreme
Court and there succeeded in having the Appellate Court decision reversed
and the original order for new trial reinstated.
The Illinois Supreme Court justified its agreement with the trial court
view on the ground that the weight of authority on the point of fixing the
measure of damage for loss of earning capacity was to the effect that gross
earnings alone should be considered and that net income ought not be
figured in arriving at a computation as to the amount of damage suffered
by a plaintiff.2 In that connection, the court noted that a plaintiff is not
permitted to comment on the fact that such items as the fees of medical
witnesses, the cost of taking depositions, the charges of court reporters,
and the expense of attorney's services are paid for by the plaintiff out of
his recovery. It being a matter of general principle that, in the trial of a
lawsuit, the status of the parties is immaterial, so "what the plaintiff does
with the award is ... of no concern to the court or jury," it followed that
15 Ill.(2d) 135, 125 N. E. (2d) 77 (1955), reversing 349 Il. App. 175, 110 N. E.
(2d) 654 (1953). Compare the holding therein with the one attained in Maus v.
New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co., - Ohio App. -, 128 N. E. (2d) 166

(1955).
2 In an annotation appearing in9 A. L. R. (2d) 320, it is suggested that where the
question has arisen, in reported cases, "the courts generally have been of the opinion
that in fixing damages for impairment of earning capacity the fact that the damage
award will be exempt from income tax, whereas if the awardee had not sustained
the loss of earning capacity and had gone to work and received the income forming
the basis of such damage award, he would have become subject to income tax liability on such earnings, is not a matter to be taken into consideration and is no
ground for diminishing the amount of damages for impairment of earning capacity."
See also Chicago & North Western Railway Co. v. Curl, 178 F. (2d) 497 (1949).
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whether or not the plaintiff paid a tax was a matter of concern only to the
plaintiff and the government and, if remarks of the kind in question were
allowed, the congressional intent "to give an injured party a tax benefit"
would be nullified.3
In the only other case to date where the precise question has arisen,
that of Dempsey v. Thompson,4 the Supreme Court of Missouri, on the
other hand, came to the conclusion that the fact that an award would not
be subject to income tax was a proper matter for the jury to consider in
determining the measure of damage. In that case, the court said: "Present
economic conditions are such that most citizens, most jurors are not only
conscious of, but acutely sensitive to, the impact of income taxes . . . Few
persons, other than those who had had special occasion to learn otherwise,
have had any knowledge of the exemption involved in this case. It is
reasonable to assume the average juror would believe the award involved
in this case to be subject to such taxes . . . Surely, the plaintiff has no
right to receive an enhanced award due to a possible and, we think, probable misconception on the part of a jury that the amount allowed by it
will be reduced by income taxes."5
As neither of the supreme courts concerned have made any attempt to
explain away the arguments on the side opposite to their respective conclusions and as the matter is of relatively unique character, it will be
interesting to see what other states may decide when the issue again comes
up for consideration. The impact of taxation being what it is, it is certain
that the question will not be left to rest on these two adverse holdings.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ACTIONS-WHETHER LEGISLATIVE PRoHBITION
AGAINST SUITS BETWEEN SPOUSES BASED ON TORTS COMMITTED DURING
COVERTURE PosSEsSEs RETROACTIVE EFFECT--0f minor but possibly noteworthy significance is the determination recently achieved by the Appellate
Court for the Fourth District in the case of Hindman v. Holmes.' In
that case, a married woman sued her husband and another charging acts
of wilful and wanton misconduct to the defendants which had caused her
to suffer personal injury. The husband, by way of answer, pleaded the
terms of an appropriate Illinois statute2 as a bar to the suit, relying on the
proposition that the acts complained of had occurred during coverture,
and thereafter moved for judgment on the pleadings. The motion for
3 5 Ii1. (2d) 135 at 151-2, 125 N. E. (2d) 77 at 86.
4363 Mo. 339, 251 S. W. (2d) 42 (1952), reversing 360 Mo. 177, 227 S. W. (2d) 675

(1948).

5 363 Mo. 339 at 346, 251 S. W. (2d) 42 at 45.
14 Ill. App. (2d) 279, 124 N. E. (2d) 344 (1955).
2 Laws 1953, p. 437; Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 1.
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judgment in favor of the husband having been granted, the plaintiff appealed on the ground the statute in question, which was passed after her
suit had been instituted, ought not be given retroactive effect but the
Appellate Court held to the contrary and affirmed the judgment dismissing
the suit.3
There can be no question over the point of the right of a spouse to
sue the other spouse on the basis of an intermarital tort occurring between
them for, despite the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of
Brandt v. Keller4 purporting to sanction litigation of that character, the
legislature subsequently acted to prohibit such suits.5 Clearly, then, the
institution of new suits of this type would not be permitted at this time.
It is possible, however, as in the instant case, that a number of actions
may have been commenced in the brief hiatus between the holding in the
Brandt case and the subsequent legislative declaration on the point, and
many of these suits might remain pending, awaiting trial. If so, it would
seem, on the basis of the instant decision, that all such suits should be
dismissed inasmuch as the court there construed the word "sue," as found
in the amended statute, to cover not only the institution of an action but
also the bringing of the same to a conclusion. To the extent that any suits
of this character remain undetermined, therefore, they would seem to fall
within the scope of the legislative prohibition as so interpreted.
JURY-RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY-WHETHER ACCUSED POssESSES AN
UNQUALIFIED

RIGHT TO

WAIvE

TRIAL

BY JURY IN

CRIMINAL

CASES-

Resolution of a doubtful issue concerning trial by jury in criminal cases
has been provided by the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in the
recent case of People v. Spegal.1 The defendant therein had been charged
with the heinous crime of murder. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to
waive trial by jury and the prosecution indicated that, it had no objection
to such waiver but the trial judge, nevertheless, forced defendant to stand
trial before a jury. He was found guilty under a verdict which fixed the
punishment at death. 2 Following disposition of motions for new trial and
3 As the lower court order did not operate to dispose of the action so far as it
related to the other defendant, the court expressed no opinion concerning the liability of that individual. On the point of the right of a wife to hold a principal
liable for a tort committed by a husband-agent, see Tallios v. Tallios. 345 I1. App.
387, 103 N. E. (2d) 507 (1952). and note in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RvE'vEW 343-9.
4 413 Ill. 503, 109 N. E. (2d) 729 (1953).
5 Laws 1953, p. 437, Il1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 1, which authorizes a
married woman to sue and be sued, now declares that "neither husband nor wife
may sue the other for a tort to the person committed during coverture."
15 111. (2d) 211, 125 N. E. (2d) 468 (1955).

2 Under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 360, the jury, if one is used, is
required to fix the punishment for murder.
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in arrest of judgment,3 the defendant was sentenced in conformity with
the verdict but, on writ of error to the Supreme Court, the conviction was
reversed and the cause was remanded for a new trial when the higher
court decided it was error to deny to the defendant an untrammelled right,
if he so wished, to waive trial before a jury.
It had, at one time, been the considered law in Illinois that a constitutional tribunal for the trial of a criminal case consisted of a combination of judge and jury, with other officers, no part of which could be
waived by the litigants unless the defendant pleaded guilty, in which case
no trial was necessary. 4 This view was forced, by the pressure of events,
to yield to the concept that a defendant charged with a criminal offense
could waive jury trial 5 but an irrational limitation was later placed around
the waiver privilege, under the holding in People v. Scornavache,6 when
the then Supreme Court, divided four to three, said that, to be effective,
the waiver had to be concurred in by the prosecution. 7 Legislative attempts to destroy this limitation s were held, in People v. Scott,9 to amount
to an unconstitutional interference with the judicial power vested in the
judicial department of the state government, 10 and it was on this basis
that the trial judge concerned in the instant case justified his refusal to
accept the proferred waiver.
The holding in the case at hand, rejecting and overruling views expressed in the Scornvache and Scott cases, not only sounds a welcome
note as it serves to place the privilege of trial by jury in criminal cases
completely in the hands, and under the control, of those to whom it rightfully belongs11 but also operates to save other statutes, such as the one
pertaining to the regulation of trial by jury in civil cases, 12 from a
similar claim of unconstitutionality.
3 The defendant urged, in support thereof, not only the trial court ruling aforementioned but an additional ruling, made after pleading not guilty, denying a

renewal of his motion to waive trial by jury to which the prosecution had offered
no objection.

See Harris v. People, 128 Ill. 585, 21 N. E. 563 (1889).
People ex rel. Swanson v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250, 172 N. E. 722 (1930).
6 347 Ill. 406, 179 N. E. 909, 79 A. L. R. 553 (1932).
7 This limitation was classed as being an "unsound requirement" in Zacharias.
"Waiver of Jury in Criminal Cases," 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 138-45 (1944),
particularly p. 143, note 48.
8 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 574; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 736.
9 383 Ill. 122, 48 N. E. (2d) 530 (1943).
10 See Ill. Const. 1870, Art. III, and Art. VI, § 1.
11 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 9, expressly states: "In all criminal proceedings
the accused shall have the right to . . . a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.
." Italics added.
12 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 188(1), which was held
constitutional in Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill. 127, 48 N. E. (2d) 508 (1943).
4
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JURY-RIGH-1T TO TRIAL BY JURY-WHETHER

PLAINTIFF' IS ENTITLED

TO DEMAND TRiAxt BY JURY WHERE DEFENDANT, ON COUNTERCLAIM,

FiRS'

ASSERS AND THEN WAIVES RIGHT TO JURY TRIA-Still another question

concerning the right to trial by jury in civil cases came before the Ap-

pellate Court for the First District when that court was recently asked,
in the case of Schwartz v. Lake View Tool & Manufacturing Company,'
to decide whether a trial court would have authority to permit a plaintiff
to demand a jury trial, when a defendant waived a prior jury demand
made by it, under circumstances where the plaintiff had filed no jury
demand whatever until after the defendant had acted to waive the request
filed by it. The case was one in which the plaintiff had filed an action in
contract in the Municipal Court of Chicago. At that time, plaintiff had
not asserted any right to a jury trial. Defendant entered an appearance,
filed an answer and counterclaim, and demanded a jury trial. 2 Plaintiff
answered the counterclaim but did not join in the jury demand of the

defendant. When the case was called for trial nearly three years later,
defendant waived its earlier demand for jury trial. At that time, plaintiff
insisted on a jury trial and, the trial court having allowed plaintiff's
motion over objection, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff on the
claim and against defendant on its counterclaim. On appeal, this holding
was reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial, on the ground it
was error to grant plaintiff's late request for jury trial.
In support of this holding, the Appellate Court pointed out that Section
30 of the Municipal Court Act, 3 as supplemented by Rule 59 of the
Municipal Court of Chicago, 4 clearly sets forth the two opportunities
afforded to a plaintiff to file a demand for jury trial, i. e., first, at the
time he commences his action, and second, at the time he files a defense, or
takes other action with respect, to a counterclaim by the defendant, if a
counterclaim is presented. If not then asserted, the right to trial by jury
is deemed waived and the plaintiff has forever lost his right to renew it.
The dominant consideration being a definite time for the making of the
demand, rather than a change in the circumstances of the parties, any

discretionary power in the trial court to extend the time for the filing of
a jury demand, provided good cause was shown, was clearly not available

to aid a plaintiff who had waited nearly three years to make his request.
14 ILL. App. (2d) 565, 124 N. E. (2d) 570 (1955).
2 This demand would necessarily apply to both the original cause and the counterclaim as the issues under both would normally be tried at the same time.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 385. The text thereof is similar to ibid.,
Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 188, so the holding in the instant case, while strictly applicable
only to the Municipal Court of Chicago, would seem to be precedent as to cases In
the state courts.
4 See Rules, Municipal Court of Chicago (1940).
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The fact that the defendant had first demanded and then waived a jury
trial was said not to be a sufficient showing of good cause on the part of
5
plaintiff as to warrant an exercise of discretion in his behalf.
While no previous case involving a similar factual situation seems
to have arisen in Illinois, the holding of the Appellate Court might well
have been foreseen in view of prior rulings on related points. It has been
said, for example, that a defendant loses the right to a jury trial if the
same is not asserted at the time of his appearance, unless an acceptable
excuse is offered to explain away the omission, 6 and that the time for
filing the demand is not enlarged by the grant of additional time in which
to plead. 7 In addition, the right may not be asserted, if originally waived,
in the event the case is remanded, following appeal, for a new trial.8 It
would appear, then, that a plaintiff who is named as a party to a counterclaim would be vigilant enough to present a jury demand with his answer
thereto if he wishes to assure himself of a jury trial as to the issues formed
on the counterclaim, even though he may have been willing to submit his
original case for trial by the court, and should not be lulled to rest by
any demand made by his opponent. If this smacks too much of the
possibility for ambush, the remedy would appear to lie in the making of
some suitable revision in the statute for it is, at present, silent on the
particular point.
WITNESSES -- COMPETENCY-WHETHER
PETENT

TO

TESTIFY AGAINST

COMMUNICATIONS

BETWEEN

WIFE

HER HUsBAND

OF

Accusmn

CONCERNING

IS

COM-

NON-PRIVILEGED

THEM-An interesting question of evidence

law was recently presented to the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of
People, v. Palumbo.' The defendant there had been indicted and placed
on trial for an illegal sale of narcotics. One witness had testified that, as
the buyer, he came to the defendant's home carrying marked bills supplied
by the police and had been handed a package of narcotics by defendant's
wife in the presence of the defendant. The prosecution then called the
defendant's wife as a corroborating witness and she testified, over objection as to her competency, to a conversation between herself and her husband, in the buyer's presence, which tended to substantiate the state's
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 188, recognizing the possibility that a
defendant may be misled to his detriment by the presence of plaintiff's request for
a jury trial, permits the defendant to first assert the right, on payment of all proper
fees, within a specified period of time after notice of the plaintiff's subsequent
waiver of trial by jury.
6 Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill. 127, 48 N. E. (2d) 508 (1943).
7 Vail, Mills & Armstrong v. City of Paris, 344 Ill. App. 590, 101 N. E. (2d) 861
(19651). But see Roszell v. Gniadek, .348 Il1. App. 341, 109 N. E. (2d) 222 (1952).
SiReese v. Laymon, 2 11. (2d) 614, 119 N. E. (2d) 271 (1954), noted in 32
CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 345.
15 Ill. (2d) 409, 125 N. E. (2d) 518 (1955).
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case. Following his conviction, the defendant brought the case before
the Illinois Supreme Court on writ of error but that court, upholding the
trial court ruling on the objection, affirmed the conviction.
Prior to the determination of the instant case, the Illinois Supreme
Court had refused to recognize the competency of a wife to testify either
2
for or against her husband in a criminal case but, in People v. Kendall,
the court did recognize the possibility that the legislature, which had
made some changes in the common law rules on the subject, might make
further changes from time to time. At about the time of that holding,
the Supreme Court of the United States decided, in Funk v. United States,
that, in line with a trend on the part of courts and legislative bodies to
remove testimonial disabilities, the wife of a defendant in a federal
criminal case was competent to be a witness in her husband's behalf. A
further step in the same direction was taken in the case of Wolfle v. United
States4 when the federal supreme court said that "Communications between the spouses, privately made, are generally assumed to have been
intended to be confidential, and hence they are privileged; but wherever
a communication, because of its nature or the circumstances under which
it was made, was obviously not intended to be confidential it is not a
privileged communication.' '
Following thereon, the Illinois legislature amended certain portions
7
of the Evidence Act 6 as well as certain portions of the Criminal Code
so as to make husbands and wives competent to testify for or against
each other, but did provide that neither might testify as to communications or admissions made by one to the other or as to conversations between them during coverture. Construing these provisions in the instant
case, the Illinois Supreme Court reached the result that it was the intention of the legislature to eliminate the general common-law testimonial
disqualification adhering to husbands and wives and to retain only the
common-law privilege as it related to confidential communications, a
privilege based upon a desire to preserve the matrimonial relationship by
drawing a cloak of protection around marital confidences. As the communication in the instant case between the husband and the wife had
been made in the presence of a third party, it was not considered confidential, hence was unworthy of judicial protection. When the case is
read in the light of the modern policy on the subject of the competency
of witnesses, it can only be said that the result obtained is an eminently
sound one.
2 357 Ill.
448, 192 N. E. 378 (1934).

8 290 U. S. 871, 54 S. Ct. 212, 78 L. Ed. 369 (1933).
4291 U. S. 7, 54 S. Ct. 280, 78 1L Ed. 617 (1933).

5291 U. S. 7 at 14, 54 S.Ct. 280, 78 L. Ed. 617 at 620.
6 Laws 1935, p. 869; Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, §5.
7 Laws 1937, p. 502; I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 734.

